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SAVE TARA AND THE MODERN STATE  
OF THE CALIFORNIA  
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ACT 
Todd Nelson* 
The California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) requires public 
review of all public and private projects that are subject to a public 
agency’s approval. Unlike many other states’ environmental laws, 
CEQA requires that projects that create significant environmental 
impacts not be approved if feasible mitigation measures or project 
alternatives exist that would reduce or eliminate those impacts. 
However, although CEQA was adopted more than forty years ago and 
has been the subject of approximately six hundred published decisions, 
there remains much uncertainty as to what agencies and project 
proponents must do to comply with CEQA and avoid judicial reversal. 
One of the most critical contested issues is the question of what 
constitutes a project for purposes of requiring CEQA analysis. This 
uncertainty was at the heart of Save Tara v. City of West Hollywood, a 
recent California Supreme Court case that set forth a new, flexible test 
for determining what actions by public agencies will constitute a CEQA 
project. This Note describes the current state of CEQA following Save 
Tara, identifies the decision’s costly impacts on previously exempt 
public-agency activities, offers suggested legislative reforms to the 
existing law, and suggests best practices for project proponents and 
public agencies that seek to comply with CEQA while avoiding 
frivolous lawsuits. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The California legislature adopted the California Environmental 
Quality Act1 (CEQA) in 1970 following the federal government’s 
adoption of the National Environmental Policy Act2 (NEPA) in 1969. 
Like NEPA, CEQA requires public agencies to review and take into 
account the environmental impacts of their actions.3 However, unlike 
NEPA, CEQA contains a substantive mandate that prohibits public 
agencies from approving public or private projects with significant 
environmental impacts if there are feasible mitigation measures or 
project alternatives that would lessen or eliminate those impacts.4 
Accordingly, California agencies, when deciding to undertake or 
approve a project,5 must conduct environmental review and certify an 
environmental analysis ensuring that these impacts have been 
eliminated or mitigated to a level of insignificance.6 
 
 1. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000–21177 (West 2007). 
 2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370(f) (2006). 
 3. PUB. RES. § 21000; Friends of Mammoth v. Bd. of Supervisors, 502 P.2d 1049, 1054–55 
(Cal. 1972); Daniel P. Selmi, Themes in the Development of the State Environmental Policy Acts, 
38 URB. LAW. 949, 982 (2006). 
 4. PUB. RES. §§ 21002, 21081; Mountain Lion Found. v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 939 P.2d 
1280, 1298 (Cal. 1997). 
 5. CEQA defines a project as: 
[A]n activity which may cause either a direct physical change in the environment, or a 
reasonably foreseeable indirect physical change in the environment, and which is any 
of the following: 
(a) An activity directly undertaken by any public agency. 
(b) An activity undertaken by a person which is supported, in whole or in part, through 
contracts, grants, subsidies, loans, or other forms of assistance from one or more public 
agencies. 
(c) An activity that involves the issuance to a person of a lease, permit, license, 
certificate, or other entitlement for use by one or more public agencies. 
PUB. RES. § 21065. As this Note describes, this definition, as well as the state’s CEQA 
guidelines’ definition of project, has been the subject of extensive judicial interpretation. 
 6. Mitigation of environmental impacts might include avoiding a proposed action 
altogether, limiting the degree of a proposed action, rectifying the impact of the action, or 
compensating for the impact of the action. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15370 (2011). Note that 
CEQA only requires mitigation measures that are feasible, and a project that creates significant 
and unavoidable impacts may still be approved if the approving agency makes certain required 
findings and adopts a “statement of overriding considerations.” PUB. RES. § 21081; tit. 14, 
§ 15091. 
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In its forty years of existence, CEQA’s statutory requirements 
and accompanying regulatory guidelines7 have produced an 
environmental review process where members of the public interact 
with public agencies to ensure that these agencies are fully informed 
of the potential environmental effects of their decisions.8 
Unsurprisingly, given CEQA’s tremendous reach into so many of the 
decisions that public agencies make, an enormous cadre of 
consultants, lawyers, development advocates, and environmentalists 
specializing in CEQA analysis has developed. To date, CEQA is the 
subject of approximately six hundred published judicial decisions,9 
which have further defined the reach and limits of the original 
statute, and have exposed some of CEQA’s inherent tensions. Many 
project opponents continue to complain that the environmental 
protections that CEQA has promised do not go far enough.10 On the 
other side, project advocates and sponsors often complain that the 
balancing of environmental and other public needs that CEQA has 
contemplated has been ignored, and that the statute has become an 
effective tool to oppose projects for reasons other than environmental 
concerns.11 
Despite numerous California appellate and supreme court 
CEQA decisions, there remains a great deal of uncertainty in the law 
regarding what agencies need to do to comply with CEQA to prevent 
judicial reversal.12 This uncertainty may create significant costs for 
agencies, as CEQA challenges have become an effective tool to 
block projects that opponents deem undesirable, even if the reasons 
for their opposition are seemingly unrelated to environmental 
 
 7. California first adopted statewide CEQA guidelines in 1973 pursuant to the authority 
granted in Public Resources Code section 21083. The guidelines are prepared by the Governor’s 
Office of Planning and Research and are written to encompass both the specific statutory 
requirements of CEQA and judicial interpretations of the statutory language. The procedures that 
public agencies adopt to implement CEQA must be consistent with these guidelines. PUB. RES. 
§§ 21082, 21083; MICHAEL H. REMY ET AL., GUIDE TO CEQA 6–7 (11th ed. 2007). The CEQA 
Guidelines appear as title 14, chapter 3 of the California Code of Regulations. CAL. CODE REGS. 
tit. 14, §§ 15000–15387 (2011). 
 8. Laurel Heights Improvement Ass’n v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 764 P.2d 278, 282–
83 (Cal. 1988). 
 9. Lisabeth D. Rothman, CEQA Turns 40: The More Things Change, the More They 
Remain the Same, ST. B. CAL. ENVTL. L. NEWS, Winter 2011, at 2, available at http:// 
www.bhfs.com/portalresource/lookup/wosid/contentpilot-core-2301-19708/pdfCopy.name=/LA. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 3. 
 12. Id. 
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impacts.13 To defend against such challenges, environmental impact 
reports (EIRs) and the supporting environmental analyses that public 
agencies produce continue to lengthen as agencies and project 
applicants attempt to provide more detail to create defensible 
documents.14 Longer EIRs take more resources and time to draft and 
review, which increases the amount of time a project proponent must 
wait until an agency approves a final EIR.15 Finally, project 
proponents often pay the agency’s costs for preparing an EIR and for 
litigation.16 
This Note examines Save Tara v. City of West Hollywood,17 a 
significant recent California Supreme Court decision dealing with a 
threshold question under CEQA—namely, what constitutes a project 
for purposes of requiring CEQA analysis? In answering this 
question, the court in Save Tara set forth a flexible and open-ended 
standard that has expanded CEQA’s reach to potentially include 
previously exempt public agency activities. This Note argues that the 
Save Tara decision has exceeded the reasonable scope of CEQA’s 
statutory language and requires a legislative remedy to ensure that 
this decision does not inordinately burden public agencies and 
private project applicants. 
Part II provides an overview of CEQA’s purposes, policies, and 
mechanisms, and it introduces some of the tensions that are inherent 
in this law. Part III first reviews several important recent decisions 
regarding the definition of a project under CEQA and then closely 
examines the facts, holding, and reasoning of the Save Tara decision. 
Part IV looks at the ramifications of Save Tara and its effects on the 
actions of public agencies. Finally, Part V proposes remedies that the 
California legislature and public agencies should pursue in order to 
fix the impacts of Save Tara. 
 
 13. Id. at 12. 
 14. Id. at 13. Private sector proponents must pay the carrying costs of holding their property 
as they await approval of their projects, while delays in public projects can hinder bond financing 
and lead to increased costs through rate increases. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. 194 P.3d 344 (Cal. 2008). 
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II.  OVERVIEW OF  
CEQA AND ITS SCOPE 
A.  Purposes of CEQA 
CEQA is a comprehensive legislative scheme designed to 
provide long-term protection to California’s environment.18 As the 
statutory language sets forth, the California legislature found and 
declared that it is the state’s policy to “[d]evelop and maintain a 
high-quality environment now and in the future, and take all action 
necessary to protect, rehabilitate, and enhance the environmental 
quality of the state.”19 Other closely related policies include 
providing Californians with clean air and water, enjoyment of 
aesthetic, scenic and historical environmental qualities, and freedom 
from excessive noise;20 preserving fish and wildlife;21 and requiring 
government agencies to develop standards and procedures to protect 
the environment.22 In addition to these clear goals, the statutory 
language includes more complicated statements that may reveal a 
policy tension at the heart of CEQA. For example, CEQA includes 
statements of purpose that emphasize the importance of meeting 
residents’ housing needs, which may directly conflict with the typical 
environmental protections that CEQA also embodies.23 As this 
example indicates, the drafters of CEQA contemplated the need to 
balance efforts to protect the environment with other practical 
considerations that California residents face.24 The California courts 
have also attempted to balance these competing goals, and CEQA’s 
 
 18. Mountain Lion Found. v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 939 P.2d 1280, 1284 (Cal. 1997). 
 19. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21001(a) (West 2007). 
 20. Id. § 21001(b). 
 21. Id. § 21001(c). 
 22. Id. § 21001(f). 
 23. The statutory language of CEQA states: 
[A]ll agencies of the state government which regulate activities of private individuals, 
corporations, and public agencies which are found to affect the quality of the 
environment, shall regulate such activities so that major consideration is given to 
preventing environmental damage, while providing a decent home and satisfying living 
environment for every Californian. 
Id. § 21000(g) (emphasis added). Furthermore, another stated policy of CEQA is to “[e]nsure that 
the long-term protection of the environment, consistent with the provision of a decent home and 
suitable living environment for every Californian, shall be the guiding criterion in public 
decisions.” Id. § 21001(d) (emphasis added). 
 24. REMY ET AL., supra note 7, at 17. 
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extensive litigation history has produced the statute’s predominant 
interpretive principle. 
B.  Interpreting CEQA 
The California Supreme Court first interpreted CEQA’s 
statutory framework in 1972 in Friends of Mammoth v. Board of 
Supervisors.25 There, the court held that CEQA should be interpreted 
so as to afford “the fullest possible protection to the environment 
within the reasonable scope of the statutory language.”26 This 
holding—requiring the broad construction of CEQA’s substantive 
and procedural requirements while simultaneously limiting that 
construction to what can be reasonably inferred from the text of the 
statute—captures the interpretive principle that has come to 
characterize CEQA analysis.27 As an indication of the importance of 
this judicial principle, the Friends of Mammoth holding has been 
incorporated into the CEQA Guidelines’ “Policies” section.28 
Other indications of tension between the broad application of 
CEQA and a more limited interpretation of its applicability exist in 
the statutory language. For example, Section 21003(f) of the 
California Public Resources Code requires that: 
All persons and public agencies involved in the 
environmental review process be responsible for carrying 
out the process in the most efficient, expeditious manner in 
order to conserve the available financial, governmental, 
physical, and social resources with the objective that those 
resources may be better applied toward the mitigation of 
actual significant effects on the environment.29 
 
 
 
 25. 502 P.2d 1049 (Cal. 1972) (en banc). 
 26. Id. at 1056. 
 27. REMY ET AL., supra note 7, at 4. 
 28. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15003(f) (2011). Other relevant court cases that speak to this 
inherent tension in CEQA are Laurel Heights Improvement Ass’n v. Regents of the University of 
California, 864 P.2d 502 (Cal. 1993) and Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors, 801 
P.2d 1161 (Cal. 1990), which together provide the policy listed under title 14, section 15003(j) of 
the California Code of Regulations (“CEQA requires that decisions be informed and balanced. It 
must not be subverted into an instrument for the oppression and delay of social, economic, or 
recreational development or advancement.”). 
 29. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21003(f) (West 2007) (emphasis added). 
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Additionally, section 21083.1 states: 
It is the intent of the Legislature that courts, consistent with 
generally accepted rules of statutory interpretation, shall not 
interpret this division or the state guidelines adopted 
pursuant to Section 21083 in a manner which imposes 
procedural or substantive requirements beyond those 
explicitly stated in this division or in the state guidelines.30 
Thus, Friends of Mammoth’s holding that CEQA be broadly 
construed to protect the environment is limited by any CEQA 
provision or adopted state CEQA guideline that explicitly restricts 
CEQA’s breadth or requires the consideration of the economic costs 
of CEQA compliance.31 
C.  Procedures of CEQA Review and  
Policies of Environmental Impact Reports 
A CEQA analysis begins with a public agency’s initial 
determination as to whether a proposed activity is subject to 
environmental review or is exempt.32 Once the agency deems an 
activity to be subject to CEQA, the initial procedural steps of the 
CEQA review process include the preparation of an initial study 
regarding the proposed activity and potential resulting impacts to the 
environment,33 and a decision to prepare either a negative 
declaration, mitigated negative declaration, or EIR.34 If an EIR is to 
 
 30. Id. § 21083.1 (emphasis added). 
 31. REMY ET AL., supra note 7, at 4–5. 
 32. An activity may be exempt from CEQA because it does not constitute a project, or 
because it fits within one of CEQA’s designated exemptions. REMY ET AL., supra note 7, at 69–
70; Selmi, supra note 3, at 960. 
 33. An initial study may take the form of a questionnaire, checklist, or narrative report 
regarding the characteristics of the proposed project or activity. tit. 14, §§ 15060, 15063, 15102, 
15365. 
 34. If the lead agency determines that no significant environmental impacts will result from 
the proposed activity, a negative declaration may be adopted. A variation of the negative 
declaration is known as a “mitigated negative declaration,” which finds that no significant 
environmental impacts will result after certain specified mitigation measures are imposed on the 
project. If significant environmental impacts may exist that cannot be mitigated, an EIR must be 
prepared. See PUB. RES. §§ 21064, 21064.5, 21080(c); tit. 14, §§ 15002(k)(2), 15070–15075, 
15369.5, 15371. See also REMY ET AL., supra note 7, at 249–50, 312–13 (describing negative 
declarations, mitigated negative declarations, and applicable thresholds for determining the 
significance of environmental impacts). 
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be prepared, the lead agency35 issues a notice of preparation of an 
EIR,36 prepares a draft EIR,37 and circulates the draft EIR for public 
review and comment.38 After the close of the public comment period, 
the lead agency prepares written responses to the comments on the 
draft EIR and prepares a final EIR incorporating these written 
comments and responses.39 In conjunction with the agency’s 
approval of the proposed project, the agency must certify the final 
EIR,40 which includes the adoption of findings regarding CEQA 
compliance,41 the adoption of a mitigation reporting or monitoring 
program,42 and the potential adoption of a statement of overriding 
considerations.43 After a final EIR is certified, a party objecting to the 
lead agency’s CEQA determination may file a petition for a writ of 
mandate seeking injunctive relief from the courts.44 
The purpose of the EIR is to identify the significant 
environmental impacts of a project, identify alternatives to the 
project, and, if possible, indicate ways that the significant impacts 
can be avoided.45 As the “heart of CEQA,” the EIR informs the 
public of the possible environmental impacts of the proposed 
 
 35. The lead agency is either the agency carrying out the proposed project or, in the case of a 
private project, the agency with the greatest responsibility for supervising or approving the 
project as a whole. tit. 14, §§ 15051(a), 15051(b)(1). 
 36. PUB. RES. § 21080.4(a); tit. 14, §§ 15082, 15375. 
 37. PUB. RES. § 21100; tit. 14, §§ 15084, 15086, 15120–15131. 
 38. PUB. RES. § 21091; tit. 14, §§ 15072–15073, 15087, 15105, 15200–15209. 
 39. PUB. RES. §§ 21091(d)(2), 21104, 21153; tit. 14, §§ 15072–15073, 15087, 15105, 
15200–15209. 
 40. To certify a final EIR, a lead agency must conclude that the EIR has been completed in 
compliance with CEQA, that the agency has reviewed and considered the information in the EIR 
prior to approving the project, and that the final EIR reflects the lead agency’s independent 
judgment and analysis. PUB. RES. § 21082.1(c)(3); tit. 14, § 15090(a). 
 41. PUB. RES. § 21081(a); tit. 14, §§ 15091(a), 15096(h). 
 42. PUB. RES. §§ 21081.6(a)(1), 21081.7; tit. 14, §§ 15091(d), 15097. 
 43. Mitigation monitoring programs are the mechanisms by which agencies ensure 
compliance with the mitigation measures included in the certified EIR. See PUB. RES. 
§ 21081.6(a); tit. 14, §§ 15091(d), 15097(a); REMY ET AL., supra note 7, at 391–92. A statement 
of overriding considerations may be adopted by a public agency when it finds that a significant 
environmental impact cannot be mitigated to a level of insignificance, but that the effects of those 
impacts are outweighed by other identified benefits. PUB. RES. § 21081(b); tit. 14, § 15093. 
 44. A detailed discussion of the mechanism of legal challenges to CEQA approvals is 
outside the scope of this Note. For an overview of this process and related issues, see 
REMY ET AL., supra note 7, at 887–921. 
 45. See REMY ET AL., supra note 7, at 35–36; see also PUB. RES. § 21061 (defining 
environmental impact report). 
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project.46 Accordingly, it fosters “informed self-government” while 
protecting the environment.47 Importantly, environmental review is 
intended to inform the public and public officials “of the 
environmental consequences of their decisions before they are 
made.”48 Therefore, EIRs are to “be prepared as early as feasible in 
the planning process to enable environmental considerations to 
influence project program and design and yet late enough to provide 
meaningful information for environmental assessment.”49 
Generally, deciding when to prepare an EIR is left to the 
agency’s reasonable judgment.50 Agencies should avoid preparing an 
EIR too early, for a proposed project may not be sufficiently well 
defined for its environmental impacts to be fully known.51 However, 
agencies should also avoid waiting too long to prepare an EIR, for 
the public and the lead agency are supposed to understand a project’s 
potential environmental impacts so that they can make informed 
decisions regarding the project before it is approved.52 At the heart of 
this timing decision is the question of when a project arises for 
purposes of CEQA. 
D.  CEQA’s Applicability to Projects 
CEQA applies to “discretionary53 projects proposed to be carried 
out or approved by public agencies . . . .”54 This statutory language 
requires a two-part analysis to determine whether CEQA applies to 
 
 46. tit. 14, § 15003(a) (citing Cnty. of Inyo v. Yorty, 108 Cal. Rptr. 377 (Ct. App. 1973)). 
 47. See Laurel Heights Improvement Ass’n v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 764 P.2d 278, 
283 (Cal. 1988). 
 48. Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Bd. of Supervisors, 801 P.2d 1161, 1167 (Cal. 1990). 
 49. tit. 14, § 15004(b) (emphasis added). 
 50. REMY ET AL., supra note 7, at 17. “The question of timing of the preparation of an EIR 
[is] basically an administrative decision to be made by a public agency consistent with the overall 
objectives of CEQA.” Mount Sutro Def. Comm. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 143 Cal. Rptr. 
365, 374 (Ct. App. 1978). 
 51. REMY ET AL., supra note 7, at 17. “[W]here future development is unspecified and 
uncertain, no purpose can be served by requiring an EIR to engage in sheer speculation as to 
future environmental consequences.” Lake Cnty. Energy Council v. Cnty. of Lake, 139 Cal. Rptr. 
176, 178 (Ct. App. 1977). 
 52. Laurel Heights Improvement Ass’n, 764 P.2d at 282–83 (Cal. 1988). 
 53. A discretionary action requires “deliberation, decision and judgment,” while a 
ministerial action is equivalent to the “performance of a duty in which the officer is left no choice 
of his own.” Johnson v. State, 447 P.2d 352, 356–57 (Cal. 1968) (quoting Morgan v. Cnty. of 
Yuba, 41 Cal. Rptr. 508, 511 (Ct. App. 1964)); see also tit. 14, §§ 15357, 15369 (defining 
discretionary and ministerial actions, respectively). 
 54. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21080(a) (West 2007). 
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an agency action—first, whether the agency has decided to approve 
an action, and second, whether the action constitutes a project.55 
While CEQA’s statutory language does not define approval, the 
CEQA Guidelines define the term as “the decision by a public 
agency which commits the agency to a definite course of action in 
regard to a project intended to be carried out by any person.”56 For 
private projects, “approval occurs upon the earliest commitment to 
issue or the issuance by the public agency of a discretionary 
contract . . . or other form of financial assistance . . . or other 
entitlement for use of the project.”57 As the courts have interpreted 
this language, an approval occurs when an agency has in fact 
foreclosed any meaningful options to going forward with the 
project.58 
CEQA’s statutory language defines a project as “an activity 
which may cause either a direct physical change in the environment, 
or a reasonably foreseeable indirect physical change in the 
environment . . . .”59 The CEQA Guidelines add some significant 
detail in defining a project as “the whole of an action, which has a 
potential for resulting in either a direct physical change in the 
environment, or a reasonably foreseeable indirect physical change in 
the environment . . . .”60 However, this is far from a clear standard 
and regularly causes concerns for agencies and project proponents.61 
The environmental review process can be very lengthy and very 
expensive. As a practical matter, some project proponents will 
require some form of preliminary indication from a city or other 
agency that their project may at least be potentially feasible before 
the proponents decide to move forward with a formal project 
 
 55. Lexington Hills Ass’n v. State, 246 Cal. Rptr. 97, 104–06 (Ct. App. 1988); REMY ET AL., 
supra note 7, at 70. Note also that actions deemed to be exempt are not subject to CEQA. An 
action may be exempt because it does not constitute approval of a project, or because it is 
categorically or statutorily exempt from CEQA. For more discussion of categorical exemptions, 
which are beyond the scope of this Note, see REMY ET AL., supra note 7, at 69–70, and Deborah 
Behles, Why CEQA Exemption Decisions Need Additional Notice Requirements, 33 ENVIRONS 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 111 (2009). 
 56. tit. 14, § 15352(a) (emphasis added). 
 57. Id. § 15352(b) (emphasis added). 
 58. REMY ET AL., supra note 7, at 71 (citing tit. 14, §§ 15004(b), 15352). 
 59. PUB. RES. § 21065. 
 60. tit. 14, § 15378(a) (emphasis added). 
 61. See REMY ET AL., supra note 7, at 77–82. 
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proposal and request for agency approval.62 However, an agency’s 
indication of support for a project may rise to the level of a project 
approval if it commits the agency to a sufficiently definite course of 
action.63 As a result of such preliminary agency support, CEQA 
review may be required for a project that is not yet fully realized, 
which may be contrary to the purposes of CEQA.64 The precise 
moment when a project comes into existence for CEQA purposes 
and what might constitute an agency’s approval of such a project has 
been consistently disputed and litigated since CEQA’s adoption.65 
E.  Previous Court Interpretations  
of Project Approvals 
California CEQA court decisions have marked the beginning of 
the “whole of the action” as the point at which the first “essential 
step culminating in an action that may affect the environment” 
occurs.66 In Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Commission of 
Ventura County,67 the California Supreme Court held that a proposed 
annexation of property by a city required an EIR, even though a 
development project proposed for the property would receive its own 
CEQA review at some unspecified time in the future.68 In reaching 
this decision, the court held that the purpose of CEQA is: 
[N]ot to generate paper, but to compel government at all 
levels to make decisions with environmental consequences 
in mind. CEQA does not, indeed cannot, guarantee that 
these decisions will always be those which favor 
environmental considerations. At the very least, however, 
the People have a right to expect that those who must 
 
 62. Application of the League of California Cities to File Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of 
Defendant/Respondent City of West Hollywood; and Proposed Brief of Amicus Curiae at 7–8, 
Save Tara v. City of W. Hollywood, 194 P.3d 344 (Cal. 2008) (No. S151402) [hereinafter Brief 
for League of California Cities]. 
 63. tit. 14, § 15352(a). 
 64. “[W]here future development is unspecified and uncertain, no purpose can be served by 
requiring an EIR to engage in sheer speculation as to future environmental consequences.” Lake 
Cnty. Energy Council v. Cnty. of Lake, 139 Cal. Rptr. 176, 178 (Ct. App. 1977). 
 65. See REMY ET AL., supra note 7, at 16–18. 
 66. Fullerton Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 654 P.2d 168, 180 (Cal. 
1982) (citing Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Comm’n, 529 P.2d 1017 (Cal. 1975)); see also 
tit. 14, § 15378(a) (defining project). 
 67. 529 P.2d 1017 (Cal. 1975) (en banc). 
 68. Id. at 1029–30. 
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decide will approach their task neutrally, with no parochial 
interest at stake.69 
The court reaffirmed Bozung in Fullerton Joint Union High School 
District v. State Board of Education.70 The court found that the State 
Board of Education must analyze the environmental effects of 
creating a new unified school district before dividing an existing 
district and must complete this analysis before authorizing an 
election by voters in the proposed new district.71 
Following the court’s decisions in Bozung and Fullerton, several 
California Court of Appeal decisions took up the issue of when a 
project approval had occurred, with varying results. In Stand Tall on 
Principles v. Shasta Union High School District,72 a school board 
passed resolutions recommending a specific development site and 
authorizing the purchase of that property for a new high school, 
“contingent upon completion of the EIR process and final state 
approval.”73 The court of appeal held that the school board had not 
“approved” the project because the resolutions did not “commit the 
District to a definite course of action.”74 Conversely, in Citizens for 
Responsible Government v. City of Albany,75 the court of appeal 
stopped a city from entering into a development agreement for a 
horse-racing track without first completing CEQA review.76 The 
agreement contained provisions for a CEQA review process, but 
called for the review to be performed after voters approved the 
agreement and several related gambling measures.77 In reaching its 
decision, the court found that the development agreement gave the 
developer of the racetrack a vested right to proceed with the project 
“within certain clear and narrowly defined parameters.”78 
Additionally, notwithstanding the election provisions, the city had 
 
 69. Id. at 1030. 
 70. 654 P.2d 168 (Cal. 1982) (en banc). 
 71. Id. at 171. 
 72. 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 107 (Ct. App. 1991). 
 73. Id. at 108. 
 74. Id. at 111. Note that the court suggested that an EIR would be required before the school 
district actually acquired the property. Id. 
 75. 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 102 (Ct. App. 1997). 
 76. Id. at 116. 
 77. Id. at 105–06. 
 78. Id. at 111. 
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“committed . . . to a definite course of action”79 and had “contracted 
away its power to consider the full range of alternatives.”80 
One year after Citizens for Responsible Government, another 
court of appeal decision swung back in the other direction in City of 
Vernon v. Board of Harbor Commissioners.81 Prior to adopting a 
final EIR, the board adopted a reuse plan for certain Navy properties 
and entered into a statement of intent with a shipping company 
regarding the parties’ intent to enter into a lease for the properties.82 
The trial court found that the board had not complied with CEQA 
because project approval was a “foregone conclusion . . . throughout 
the CEQA process.”83 However, the court of appeal reversed, finding 
that the reuse plan could be amended if necessary to mitigate 
environmental impacts identified in the project’s EIR and that the 
statement of intent to enter into a lease did not create a vested right.84 
In 2007, the court of appeal heard four CEQA cases regarding 
whether an agency action constituted approval of a project. Each of 
these four cases also involved agreements between cities and project 
proponents conditioned on future compliance with CEQA. Of these 
four cases, Concerned McCloud Citizens v. McCloud Community 
Services District85 (McCloud) and Save Tara v. City of West 
Hollywood86 would prove to be the most significant.87 
In McCloud, a citizens’ group filed a petition for a writ of 
mandate regarding an agreement between the McCloud Community 
 
 79. Id. at 114. 
 80. Id. at 115. 
 81. 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 497 (Ct. App. 1998). 
 82. Id. at 500. 
 83. Id. at 501. 
 84. Id. at 503–04. 
 85. 54 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1 (Ct. App. 2007). 
 86. 54 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856 (Ct. App. 2007). 
 87. The two other appellate court cases from 2007 were Friends of the Sierra Railroad v. 
Tuolumne Park and Recreation District, 54 Cal. Rptr. 3d 500 (Ct. App. 2007), and County of 
Amador v. City of Plymouth, 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d 704 (Ct. App. 2007). In Friends of the Sierra 
Railroad, the court found that sale of land, to allegedly facilitate a proposed casino development 
that was conditioned on future compliance with CEQA, was not itself a project subject to CEQA, 
because no particular development plans had been announced and because any discussion of 
proposed development in conjunction with the sale of the property was too speculative to trigger 
CEQA analysis. 54 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 501, 504–05. In County of Amador, the court found that a 
municipal services agreement between the city and Indian tribe, which would have required the 
city to vacate a portion of a public road to provide access to a proposed casino, committed the city 
to a definite course of action, and thereby constituted an approval of a project requiring CEQA 
analysis. 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 706–07. 
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Services District, which supplied the town of McCloud with its 
drinking water supply, and Nestle Waters North America. The 
agreement, which would have run for an initial fifty-year period with 
a guaranteed right of renewal for another fifty years, provided that 
the district would sell 1,600 acre-feet of spring water each year to 
Nestle for bottling and sale.88 The agreement required Nestle to 
comply with a number of conditions, including locating a suitable 
site for a required bottling plant, designing a new separate water 
collection and delivery system so as not to interrupt the district’s 
other water delivery obligations, and obtaining all required 
discretionary permits and performing environmental review under 
CEQA.89 
The McCloud trial court found that the agreement constituted an 
“initial and integral stage of a project within the meaning of 
CEQA,”90 because the approval of the agreement amounted to “the 
creation of an entitlement for Nestle and committed the District to a 
definite course of action.”91 On review, the court of appeal agreed 
that Nestle’s “ultimate” purchase of spring water—which would 
involve constructing a new local bottling facility, trucking or piping 
the water to this proposed facility, potentially digging new 
groundwater wells, and other related activities—would “amount to a 
project requiring CEQA compliance.”92 However, the court found 
that the execution of the agreement did not constitute an “approval” 
of a project, nor did it commit the district to a particular course of 
action, due to the multiple contingencies in the agreement, the fact 
that neither party was bound to the agreement until CEQA review 
and compliance were completed, and the fact that the district was not 
prevented from considering (and imposing as conditions of approval) 
all feasible mitigation measures.93 
In Save Tara v. City of West Hollywood,94 the court of appeal 
rejected a city’s approval of an agreement conditioned on future 
CEQA review. The facts of Save Tara recalled many of the same 
 
 88. McCloud, 54 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 3–6. 
 89. Id. at 3–4. 
 90. Id. at 5. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 8. 
 93. Id. 
 94. 54 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856 (Ct. App. 2007). 
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concepts that were at issue in McCloud, but the appellate decisions 
were in clear conflict with each other.95 Recognizing this analytical 
divide, the California Supreme Court granted review to Save Tara. 
III.  THE SAVE TARA DECISION AND  
THE NEW LANDSCAPE OF CEQA 
A.  Save Tara Case  
Background and Holding 
In 1997, the City of West Hollywood (the “City”) received a 
donation of a large colonial-revival-style house located at 1343 
North Laurel Avenue.96 The house was originally constructed in 1923 
and was designated as a local cultural resource in 1994.97 At the time 
of its donation to the City, the house had been converted into four 
apartment units.98 In 2003, two nonprofit community housing 
developers proposed the development of approximately thirty-five 
low-income housing units for senior citizens on the property and 
approached the City for assistance with the developers’ grant 
application to the United States Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD).99 On June 9, 2003, the city council approved 
the granting of a purchase option to the developers in order for the 
developers to demonstrate to HUD that they were in control of the 
project site.100 In a June 10, 2003, letter in support of the HUD grant 
application, the city manager stated that the City had approved the 
sale of the property to the developers at a negligible cost and would 
commit an additional $1 million toward development costs.101 
 
 95. Todd W. Smith, Save Tara and Concerned McCloud Citizens: When Do Conditional 
Agreements Require CEQA Review?, ABA ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESSMENT COMMITTEE NEWSL., 
May 2008, at 11, 12. 
 96. Save Tara v. City of W. Hollywood, 194 P.3d 344, 349 (Cal. 2008). The house had been 
nicknamed “Tara” by longtime owner and resident Elsie Weisman (whose favorite movie was 
Gone with the Wind) for its look of a grand Southern manor. Allegra Allison, Op-Ed., Accidental 
Activist, WEHONEWS.COM (Apr. 22, 2010), http://wehonews.com/z/wehonews/archive/page.php? 
articleID=4703. 
 97. Save Tara, 194 P.3d at 349. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
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In late 2003, HUD approved a $4.2 million grant to the 
developers.102 The City sent e-mail and newsletter announcements to 
residents regarding the grant, explaining that it “will be used to build 
35 affordable senior residential units, rehabilitate a historic house, 
and provide a public pocket park on Laurel Avenue.”103 Shortly after 
the City announced the grant award, a City housing manager told a 
tenant of the property that she would be relocated in connection with 
the new project.104 
In April 2004, the City announced an upcoming public hearing 
to consider the approval of an agreement to facilitate the 
development of the project, which would be “subject to 
environmental review” and other required approvals.105 A group of 
City residents, calling themselves “Save Tara,” wrote to the City to 
urge that CEQA review be performed before the City approved any 
new agreement or made any further commitment to the proposed 
project.106 At its May 2004 meeting, the City proceeded to approve 
the proposed agreement. This agreement expressly withheld the 
City’s commitment to a definite course of action regarding the 
project, and explicitly conditioned the property’s final conveyance 
on the satisfaction of “all applicable requirements of CEQA.”107 
Notably, however, the agreement allowed the city manager to waive 
these conditions.108 In July 2004, Save Tara filed a petition for a writ 
of mandate; the group alleged that the City had violated CEQA by 
failing to prepare an EIR prior to its May approval of the conditional 
agreement.109 
The trial court denied Save Tara’s petition, but the court of 
appeal later reversed, finding that the proposed project was well-
enough defined so as to allow meaningful analysis under CEQA and 
 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. The e-mail described the project as a “win-win-win” for the city. Id. 
 104. Id. at 350. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 355. This agreement was identified as a “Conditional Agreement for Conveyance 
and Development of Property.” Id. at 350. It contained details of the exterior and interior design 
of the project, the phases of development, the City’s conveyance of the property, and a City loan 
to the developer. Id.  
 108. Id. at 351. 
 109. In August 2004, the City executed a revised agreement that removed the city manager’s 
discretion to waive the contingent CEQA analysis. Id. This did not cause the Save Tara 
organization to withdraw their lawsuit. Id. 
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that this analysis should have occurred between the awarding of the 
HUD grant in 2003 and the City’s 2004 approval of the conditional 
agreement.110 Attempting to define a bright-line rule, the court of 
appeal held that any agreement, whether conditional or 
unconditional, would constitute an approval requiring CEQA 
analysis if the project were sufficiently well defined at the time of the 
agreement.111 In 2007, the California Supreme Court granted the 
City’s petition for review to take up the substantive question of 
whether an EIR was required before the City’s approval of the 
conditional agreement.112 
1.  Supreme Court’s Review of EIR Timing Requirements 
The court first looked at the CEQA Guidelines’ statement that 
an “approval” of a private project “occurs upon the earliest 
commitment to issue or the issuance by the public agency of a 
discretionary contract, grant, subsidy, loan or other form of financial 
assistance . . . .”113 The court also noted that the Guidelines require 
agencies to balance the timing of CEQA analysis—an agency should 
not require an EIR until the project is sufficiently defined to permit a 
meaningful environmental assessment, but should not delay 
preparing an EIR for so long that it fails to serve its intended 
function as a tool to aid an agency in making a fully informed 
decision on a project.114 
On review, the court determined that Save Tara’s challenge to 
the City both postponing its EIR preparation and making CEQA 
analysis of the project contingent on future conditions involved 
predominantly procedural issues.115 In addition, the court framed this 
timing question by asking whether the City’s approval of the 
 
 110. Id. at 352. 
 111. Id. at 358. 
 112. Id. at 352. Note that while this lawsuit was making its way through the courts, the City 
did in fact certify an EIR for the project in 2006, causing one court of appeal justice to write a 
dissenting opinion, arguing that Save Tara’s suit was moot. The supreme court agreed to hear the 
City’s mootness argument but quickly dismissed it, noting that no irreversible changes had 
occurred to the property during the pendency of the lawsuit, and that Save Tara could still receive 
the relief it was seeking (i.e., for the City to rescind its approvals of the project). Id. at 352–53. 
 113. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15352(b) (2011). 
 114. Save Tara, 194 P.3d at 353–54 (citing tit. 14, § 15004(b)). 
 115. Id. at 355. 
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conditional agreement was in fact a project for CEQA purposes.116 
As a result, the court could independently review the City’s action on 
a de novo basis with heightened scrutiny.117 As the court explained, 
this review ensures that agencies cannot evade the central purposes 
of CEQA by establishing procedures that allow for the approval of a 
project to occur prior to the EIR preparation.118 Therefore, the court 
needed to closely examine the specifics of the City’s conditional 
agreement. 
2.  Was the City’s Conditional CEQA Compliance Allowed? 
The California Supreme Court did not follow the court of 
appeal’s holding that any agreement, conditional or unconditional, 
would necessarily trigger CEQA analysis.119 Nor did it agree with the 
City that the conditional agreement in question satisfied CEQA, or 
that an agency commitment constituting a CEQA approval should be 
limited to unconditional agreements that irrevocably vest 
development rights and bind the agency to a definite course of 
action.120 Instead, the court adopted an intermediate test. It held that 
while a CEQA compliance condition can be a legitimate ingredient 
in a “preliminary public-private agreement for exploration of a 
proposed project” if the agreement, “viewed in light of all the 
surrounding circumstances, commits the public agency as a practical 
matter to the project,” the insertion of a CEQA compliance condition 
will not prevent the agreement from being considered an approval 
requiring CEQA review.121 
The court justified its holding by noting that if CEQA analysis 
were only limited to unconditional agency commitments that vested 
specific development rights for a project, by the time such actions 
occur, the project may have already acquired so much “bureaucratic 
 
 116. Id. (citing Muzzy Ranch v. Solano Cnty. Airport Land Use Comm’n, 160 P.3d 116 (Cal. 
2007)). 
 117. Id. (citing Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Bd. of Supervisors, 801 P.2d 1161 (Cal. 1990), 
and Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova, 150 P.3d 
709 (Cal. 2007)). 
 118. Id. (“While an agency may certainly adjust its rules so as to set ‘[t]he exact date of 
approval,’ . . . an agency has no discretion to define approval so as to make its commitment to a 
project precede the required preparation of an EIR.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). 
 119. Id. at 358–59. 
 120. Id. at 360. 
 121. Id. at 356. 
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and financial momentum” that a strong incentive would exist to 
ignore environmental concerns.122 Additionally, postponing the EIR 
process until a binding development agreement exists would 
undermine CEQA’s goal of demonstrating to the public that the 
environmental implications of a project have in fact been analyzed.123 
Instead, such postponement creates a risk that the EIR will be viewed 
as a post hoc rationalization of the agency’s action.124 
3.  Did the City Approve or Commit to the Project? 
To apply its new intermediate test, the court stated that the terms 
of the agreement itself, as well as the surrounding circumstances, 
should be analyzed to determine whether the City committed itself to 
the project.125 Applying this approach to the facts of the case, the 
court found that the City’s May and August agreements showed 
commitment to the project.126 The City repeatedly stated that the 
project would be developed as outlined in the HUD application, and 
allowed a nearly $500,000 loan to the developers that was not 
conditioned on CEQA compliance and would not be repaid if the 
City did not give final approval to the project.127 Furthermore, the 
May agreement limited the City’s discretion over the CEQA process 
by granting the city manager the authority to waive CEQA 
requirements.128 Although this provision was revised in the August 
agreement so that the city manager no longer had the authority to 
determine or waive CEQA compliance, the court held that the city 
council’s prior approval of the May agreement “had shown a 
willingness to give up further authority over CEQA compliance in 
favor of dependence on the city manager’s determination.”129 Finally, 
the agreements included language that the “‘requirements of CEQA’ 
be ‘satisfied,’” raising questions as to whether the City would be able 
 
 122. Id. at 358 (citing Laurel Heights Improvement Ass’n v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 764 
P.2d 278 (Cal. 1988)). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 359–60 (citing Citizens for Responsible Gov’t v. City of Albany, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
102 (Ct. App. 1997)). 
 125. Id. at 360. 
 126. Id. at 361. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 362. 
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to reject the project on substantive grounds even if it found the EIR 
legally adequate.130 
Furthermore, the court found evidence of the City’s approval of 
the project in the overall circumstances surrounding the conditional 
agreement. Specifically, the court pointed to the City’s public e-
mails and newsletters unequivocally advancing support for the 
project, preliminary tenant relocation actions, and willingness to 
condition its obligation to convey the property based on whether 
CEQA was satisfied as “reasonably determined” by the city 
manager.131 Ultimately, the provisions in the City’s agreements and 
the surrounding factual circumstances convinced the court that the 
City had improperly “committed itself to a definite course of action 
regarding the project before fully evaluating its environmental 
effects.”132 
4.  Distinction from Precedent Decisions 
The Save Tara court briefly discussed the Stand Tall and 
McCloud decisions, and “without questioning the[ir] correctness” on 
their facts, noted that each of those cases involved particular 
circumstances that limited their reaches.133 According to the court, 
the agreement at the center of McCloud did not contain sufficiently 
definite detail regarding the proposed water bottling plant, and this 
lack of detail would cause any environmental analysis to be 
premature and speculative.134 Thus, the court’s reading of McCloud 
requires a court to look at issues of “definiteness” when it is 
examining an agency’s commitment to a project. 
In distinguishing Stand Tall, the Save Tara court noted that this 
case involved a property purchase agreement that may, “as a 
practical matter in a competitive real estate market,” sometimes need 
to be initiated before completing CEQA analysis.135 In fact, Section 
15004(b)(2)(A) of the CEQA Guidelines makes a specific exception 
for these types of purchase agreements.136 While agencies may not 
 
 130. Id. at 361. 
 131. Id. at 362–63. 
 132. Id. at 363. 
 133. Id. at 356. 
 134. Id. at 356–57. 
 135. Id. at 357. 
 136. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15004(b)(2)(A) (2011). 
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“make a decision to proceed with the use of a site for facilities which 
would require CEQA review” before conducting such review, 
agencies are explicitly authorized to “designate a preferred site for 
CEQA review and may enter into land acquisition agreements when 
the agency has conditioned the agency’s future use of the site on 
CEQA compliance.”137 The Save Tara court generously stated that 
the CEQA Guidelines’ exception for land purchases is a “reasonable 
interpretation of CEQA,” but warned that this exception, which 
Stand Tall relied on, should not “swallow the general rule (reflected 
in the same regulation) that a development decision having 
potentially significant environmental effects must be preceded, not 
followed, by CEQA review.”138 The Save Tara decision thus cabins 
both the previously clearly understood meaning of Section 
15004(b)(2)(A) of the CEQA Guidelines and the precedent holdings 
in McCloud and Stand Tall, and imposes its new fact-specific inquiry 
on future conditional agreements. 
5.  Is the Save Tara Test Workable? 
The Save Tara court explicitly refrained from establishing a 
bright-line rule that would require any agreement pertaining to the 
development of a well-defined project to be subject to CEQA, and 
the court declined to limit its holding to unconditional agreements 
that irrevocably vest development rights.139 As a result, the Save Tara 
test that the court required is a fact-specific inquiry where an 
agreement’s conditioning of final approval on CEQA compliance is 
relevant but not determinative of whether the agreement constitutes a 
project for CEQA purposes.140 The court did acknowledge that cities, 
particularly with respect to projects on public land, often reach 
arrangements with potential developers—including purchase option 
agreements, memoranda of understanding, and exclusive negotiating 
agreements—before they decide on the specifics of a project.141 
However, because the court declined to set forth a clear threshold for 
analyzing these particular forms of agreement to determine whether 
such agreements would constitute approval of a project, it remains 
 
 137. Save Tara, 194 P.3d at 357 (quoting tit. 14, § 15004(b)(2)(A)). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 360. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 359. 
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unclear when, for example, a redevelopment agency must undertake 
environmental review in connection with an exclusive negotiation 
agreement or when a transportation agency leasing land for 
development must undertake environmental review if the agency has 
publicly stated its support for a future project or provided any other 
sort of tangible support. 
B.  Subsequent Application  
of the Save Tara Test 
California courts of appeal have subsequently applied the 
flexible Save Tara test in several cases, and each decision proves that 
determining whether a development-related agreement constitutes a 
project approval under CEQA is highly dependent on the particular 
facts of the agreement. 
In RiverWatch v. Olivenhain Municipal Water District,142 a 
water district entered into an agreement with a county agency to 
truck water to a landfill site without considering an EIR that the 
agency prepared for the landfill project.143 Following Save Tara, the 
court of appeal examined the specific terms of the agreement and the 
circumstances surrounding the agreement.144 It found that the 
agreement itself constituted an approval of the landfill project 
because it set forth specific details about the district’s obligation to 
deliver water and construct roadway improvements to allow the 
deliveries.145 
The court’s finding of a CEQA violation in the RiverWatch case 
contrasts with the courts of appeal’s other applications of the Save 
Tara test to date. In Parchester Village Neighborhood Council v. 
City of Richmond,146 a city entered into a municipal services 
agreement with a tribe, which required the tribe to pay the city for 
certain fire, police, and public works services, in return for the city’s 
support of the tribe’s casino application to federal authorities.147 
 
 142. 88 Cal. Rptr. 3d 625 (Ct. App. 2009). 
 143. As a responsible agency, the water district had a responsibility to consider those aspects 
of the project that were subject to its jurisdiction. Id. at 638–39 (citing CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, 
§ 15381 (2011)). 
 144. Id. at 644. 
 145. Id. The court also examined the district’s actions while reviewing and approving the 
agreement, and found that these actions constituted a “commitment” to the project. Id. 
 146. 105 Cal. Rptr. 3d 736 (Ct. App. 2010). 
 147. Id. at 739–40. 
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While the agreement did not require the city to commit to any 
changes in the environment, it provided that if the city did make any 
such changes, the city would perform CEQA analysis.148 In addition 
to finding that the casino was not a project of the city’s within the 
meaning of CEQA,149 the court held that this agreement simply 
constituted a city-funding mechanism and did not represent a 
commitment to any particular project at any particular time.150 
The court of appeals upheld another preliminary agreement in 
City of Santee v. County of San Diego.151 There, the city and county 
executed an agreement that identified two potential sites for a prison 
reentry facility, acknowledged that the county would have 
preferential access to state funding if one of the sites was selected, 
and committed the county to convey land if one of the sites was 
selected.152 The agreement also contained a contingent CEQA 
analysis provision.153 The court held that this agreement did not 
commit the county to a definite course of action because it did not 
select any single location for the reentry facility, did not reference 
any particular jail facility for which the funding would be used, and 
did not obligate the county to select any of the sites.154 
To date, a court of appeal’s most detailed application of the Save 
Tara test has been Cedar Fair L.P. v. City of Santa Clara.155 In 
conjunction with the planned development of a new football stadium 
for the San Francisco 49ers, the city and its redevelopment agency 
adopted by public vote a thirty-nine-page “stadium term sheet” that 
described a well-defined proposed project.156 The term sheet 
specified various city obligations pertaining to the proposed stadium, 
including the responsibility of creating the stadium authority to build, 
own, and operate the stadium, and to form a community facilities 
 
 148. Id. at 740. 
 149. Id. at 742 (“In our view, the Tribe’s casino development does not constitute a ‘project’ of 
the City under CEQA because the City has no legal authority over the property upon which the 
casino will be situated.”). 
 150. Id. at 745. 
 151. 111 Cal. Rptr. 3d 47 (Ct. App. 2010). 
 152. Id. at 49. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 54–55. 
 155. 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 667 (Ct. App. 2011). 
 156. Id. at 679–81. The term sheet described the proposed stadium’s location, seating 
capacity, ownership structure, lease terms, and anticipated economic benefits to accrue to the city. 
Id. at 679. 
  
Fall 2011] SAVE TARA 313 
district for special taxation purposes.157 City officials publicly 
discussed the possibility of a new stadium in the city, and the city 
was allegedly a vocal and vigorous advocate of the proposed 
project.158 
However, the term sheet also explicitly stated that its purpose 
was to memorialize preliminary terms that had been negotiated to 
date.159 Furthermore, the term sheet provided that the stadium shall 
not proceed unless full agreements were executed “based upon 
information produced from the CEQA environmental review 
process . . . .”160 The term sheet itself and the agenda reports from the 
city’s approval of the term sheet indicate that the city retained the 
flexibility to approve a different project, or no project at all.161 
Finally, the term sheet explicitly stated that it was not intended “to 
create any binding contractual obligations” nor “commit any Party to 
a particular course of action.”162 
In reviewing the term sheet and the city’s actions, the court of 
appeal applied the Save Tara test and closely compared the facts of 
that case to the Cedar Fair facts. The court acknowledged that 
“[d]etermining on which side of the Save Tara line the term sheet 
falls is not an easy judgment call,”163 and it recited the extensive 
project details that were contained in the term sheet.164 The court 
ultimately held, however, that the term sheet merely memorialized 
various preliminary negotiating terms and only mandated that the 
parties use the term sheet as the framework for future negotiations.165 
Therefore, approval of the term sheet did not trigger CEQA review. 
These opinions show that the fact-specific, open-ended Save 
Tara test provides flexibility for project proponents and detractors to 
make arguments regarding CEQA compliance. It also demonstrates a 
lack of certainty regarding whether agency actions may be subject to 
CEQA. Although the Save Tara decision noted that certain 
 
 157. Id. at 680. 
 158. Id. at 683. 
 159. Id. at 679. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 681. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 679. 
 164. Id. at 679–81. 
 165. Id. at 681. 
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preliminary agreements with potential developers may not trigger the 
expensive EIR process and that certain agreements have been upheld 
in Parchester, Santee, and Cedar Fair, the lack of a bright-line test 
means that alleged violations of CEQA under a Save Tara test will 
likely continue to be litigated on a case-by-case basis. 
IV.  SAVE TARA’S UNCERTAINTY  
HAS HIGH COSTS 
Nonprofit affordable-housing providers frequently use 
conditional agreements, such as the agreement at issue in Save Tara, 
to demonstrate that they have sufficient “site control” over proposed 
affordable-housing sites to secure the funds that are needed to go 
through the lengthy and costly process of seeking land use 
entitlements and participating in the review process that CEQA 
requires.166 Rather than constituting approval of a project, “these 
agreements merely give nonprofit, affordable-housing providers the 
ability to chase financing for the proposed project and, once 
obtained, to maintain it during the often very lengthy land use 
entitlement and CEQA assessment process.”167 While previous court 
decisions interpreting Section 15004(b)(2)(A) of the CEQA 
Guidelines, including the Stand Tall decision, may have once been 
relied on to exempt such land acquisition agreements, now a court 
must perform a fact-specific inquiry into potential “commitment” 
under Save Tara. As a result, affordable-housing providers may find 
that cities are less willing to enter into such agreements, thereby 
hindering housing developers from successfully obtaining funding. 
Moreover, following Cedar Fair, these agreements may need to be 
limited to preliminary negotiating points and contain a basic level of 
flexibility regarding the scope of the proposed project. In order to 
restructure precedent agreements so as to avoid any semblance of 
city or agency “precommitment” to a project, affordable-housing 
developers will be required to expend more of their limited time and 
resources on such predevelopment activities, which may delay or 
 
 166. Application of Housing California and the Southern California Association of Nonprofit 
Housing to File Amici Curiae Brief in Support of Appellant City of West Hollywood; Proposed 
Brief of Amici Curiae at 2, Save Tara v. City of W. Hollywood, 194 P.3d 344 (Cal. 2008) (No. 
S151402) [hereinafter Brief for Housing California]. 
 167. Id. at 11. 
  
Fall 2011] SAVE TARA 315 
otherwise obstruct the ultimate success of their proposed housing 
projects. 
Additionally, beyond the scope of a specific agreement with a 
city or other agency, these providers must also demonstrate the 
feasibility of a proposed project to public agencies and potential 
funders, which requires the preparation of design concepts, financial 
proformas, and community outreach efforts.168 If these materials are 
shared and made publicly available as part of an agency’s decision to 
enter into a conditional agreement, they could become part of the 
“circumstances” that a court takes into account when it determines 
whether a project approval has occurred under Save Tara. 
As a result, because the Save Tara test may require that such 
conditional agreements constitute some evidence of a project 
“approval,” affordable-housing providers may be required to “devote 
their scarce resources to participating in CEQA review before they 
even know whether they can secure all of the funding required to 
pursue the affordable-housing projects or whether they will be 
permitted to construct on publicly-owned land.”169 This 
reprioritization will burden affordable-housing providers with 
substantial new barriers, making it even more difficult to provide 
needed housing for low-income populations. 
Beyond affordable-housing projects, many cities offer processes 
to provide developers with predevelopment application consultations 
to assist the developers with their development-proposal submittals. 
Local governments often established these processes to meet the 
California Permit Streamlining Act.170 Predevelopment submissions 
“typically contain conceptual site plans, square footage information 
for buildings, renderings, floor layouts, parking layouts, on-site 
traffic circulation, parking, space requirements, setbacks, building 
heights and other detailed information.”171 City staff, after looking at 
a developer’s submission, “can then provide preliminary review and 
 
 168. Id. at 8–9. 
 169. Id. at 3. 
 170. CAL. GOVT. CODE §§ 65920–65964 (West 2009). The Permit Streamlining Act attempts 
to provide relief for project applicants by prohibiting protracted and unjustified delays in the 
processing of permit applications. Id. (explaining the purpose of the Permit Streamlining Act in 
the statute’s “Notes of Decisions”). For a discussion of the Permit Streamlining Act’s relation to 
CEQA, see REMY ET AL., supra note 7, at 707–26. 
 171. Brief for League of California Cities, supra note 62, at 7–8. 
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feedback.”172 Some cities may even suggest public workshops and 
community presentations so the developer can gather input and 
potentially redesign the project to be more acceptable to the 
community. It may only be after all of these steps that the developer 
precisely determines what the proposed project may be, and that it 
formally submits an application for that specific project to the city 
for review, at which point the CEQA analysis will be performed.173 If 
a city were to require CEQA review at the moment that a 
preliminary, speculative project is first presented to city staff, many 
potentially beneficial projects would fail to advance beyond this 
initial stage as a result of the delayed timeline and increased costs of 
CEQA compliance. 
In addition to increased costs and development obstacles for 
project proponents, the Save Tara decision will result in additional 
costs to cities and public agencies. In order to comply with Save 
Tara, agencies have already revisited their internal policies and 
procedures regarding exclusive negotiating agreements and 
memoranda of understanding, and they have required these 
agreements to be less specific regarding proposed projects and more 
explicit regarding withholding approval until CEQA analysis is 
completed.174 However, even after such revisions to internal policies 
are made, the threat of a Save Tara violation may compel an agency 
to prematurely undertake CEQA review “before a potential project’s 
impacts can be reasonably foreseen.”175 Furthermore, the Save Tara 
holding gives project opponents a simple tool that they can use to 
threaten a public agency with a lawsuit, resulting in slower, more 
deliberate agency action.176 
 
 172. Id. at 8. 
 173. Id. 
 174. See, e.g., Memorandum on Exclusive Negotiating Agreement and Predevelopment Loan 
with Affordable Housing Associates to the City of Sonoma City Council (May 20, 2009) 
[hereinafter Memorandum to the City of Sonoma City Council], available at 
http://www.sonomacity.org/Uploads/19121.pdf (city council staff report stating that a proposed 
exclusive negotiating agreement is explicitly contingent on future CEQA compliance and does 
not constitute approval of any defined project). 
 175. Brief for League of California Cities, supra note 62, at 2. 
 176. See, e.g., Memorandum of Affordable Housing Loan Program Guidelines from Jennifer 
Estrella, Senior Fin. Analyst, City of Elk Grove, to City of Elk Grove City Council (Oct. 13, 
2010), available at http://www.elkgrovecity.org/documents/agendas/attachments/attachments/ 
2010/10-13-10_10.3.pdf (city staff recommending that the city council proceed cautiously with 
all future affordable housing predevelopment and loan application matters in light of the Save 
Tara decision). 
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It is not surprising that Save Tara has become a watchword for 
both project opponents and antidevelopment advocates and that 
many CEQA lawsuits that these parties threaten point to the 
arguments that the court set forth in Save Tara.177 As a result, cities 
and public agencies have responded by changing internal policies 
regarding entering into conditional agreements.178 Generally, in an 
effort to avoid the appearance of premature commitment to a project, 
cities and agencies have ensured that many preliminary conditional 
agreements now contain less specific information regarding potential 
projects, including less discussion of why the project may be 
beneficial to the city or agency.179 In addition, agencies may become 
more reticent to make any public statements about projects that could 
be interpreted as supporting the project prior to any official 
approval.180 One potential and undesirable cumulative effect of these 
changes is that less information may be publicly available regarding 
potential projects, in direct conflict with CEQA’s purpose of 
informing the public of potential environmental issues. 
The Cedar Fair decision indicates that a city or other public 
agency may approve a detailed preliminary agreement regarding a 
project without violating Save Tara, so long as the approval remains 
an “agreement to agree” that is nonbinding, that is conditioned on 
future CEQA review, and that preserves a city’s flexibility regarding 
the project.181 However, under the Save Tara test, the facts of each 
 
 177. See, e.g., Letter from Amy L. White, Interim Exec. Dir., LandWatch Monterey Cnty., to 
Lou Calcagno, Chair, Monterey Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors (Apr. 28, 2009), available at 
http://www.landwatch.org/pages/issuesactions/coastal/042809bosletter.html (opposing any water-
rights memorandum of agreement on the basis of an alleged Save Tara violation); see also Letter 
from We Are Marina Del Rey to L.A. Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n (Oct. 21, 2009), available at 
http://www.wearemdr.com/projects/public-comments-letter-on-senior-uxury-retirement-
hotel~print.shtml (opposing the conceptual approval of a proposed mixed-use project on the basis 
of an alleged Save Tara violation). 
 178. See, e.g., Memorandum of Revised Joint Development Policies and Procedures from 
Nelia S. Custodio, Transp. Planning Manager, to the L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth. (Oct. 14, 
2009), available at http://boardarchives.metro.net/Items/2009/10_October/20091014P& 
PItem6.pdf (public agency staff report recommending changes to agency policies regarding 
exclusive negotiating agreements to make contingent CEQA compliance more explicit and to 
eliminate the checklist requirement for proposed project details). 
 179. Id. 
 180. See, e.g., Memorandum on CEQA Analysis of KBRA and KHSA from Thomas P. 
Guarino, Cnty. Counsel, Office of Siskiyou Cnty. Counsel (Mar. 17, 2010), available at 
http://www.co.siskiyou.ca.us/BOS/DOCS/KBRA/All%20Parties%20and%20Persons_Release%2
0of%20CEQA%20Analysis%2003_17_10%20MEM%20with%20Analysis%20Attached.pdf. 
 181. Jennifer Hernandez et al., California Appeals Court Offers Guidance on When an 
Agency’s Agreement with a Developer Requires Environmental Review Under CEQA, HOLLAND 
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potential project approval are unique, and the facts pertaining to the 
proposed development of a National Football League (NFL) stadium 
in Cedar Fair—a huge, politically advantaged project requiring 
years of negotiation between multiple parties—are very different 
from the facts typically surrounding smaller, less politically 
advantaged projects.182 Given the political and economic momentum 
that can build up behind such large projects, the flexibility that the 
city retained to modify or reject the stadium project in Cedar Fair 
may not have seriously jeopardized the negotiations between the city, 
the NFL, and other stakeholders, while similar flexibility that a city 
or other public agency retains regarding a smaller project may 
threaten the necessary funding or political support for that project.183 
Accordingly, Cedar Fair provides guidance to cities and project 
applicants for drafting some preliminary agreements that are made 
conditional on CEQA compliance. Nevertheless, under Save Tara, a 
court may still determine that regardless of such conditional CEQA 
compliance language, a preliminary agreement, as a practical matter, 
may commit the agency to the project, and would therefore be 
subject to environmental review. 
 
& KNIGHT ENV’T. ALERT, 1, 2 (May 17, 2011), http://www.hklaw.com/default.aspx?id=24660& 
PublicationId=3121&ReturnId=31&ContentId=55541&pdf=yes. 
 182. A detailed discussion of the political and economic momentum that can build behind 
such large projects is beyond the scope of this Note; however, two recently proposed football 
stadiums in Southern California provide relevant examples of this phenomenon. After a CEQA 
lawsuit was filed against Majestic Realty’s proposed NFL stadium in the City of Industry, the 
developer successfully lobbied state legislators to grant a statutory exemption from any such 
CEQA action. Jeremy H. Danney, Comment, Sacking CEQA: How NFL Stadium Developers May 
Have Tackled the California Environmental Quality Act, 19 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 131, 143–
45 (2011). Similarly, Anschutz Entertainment Group recently obtained approval of a bill that 
would fast-track any CEQA lawsuit filed against its proposed downtown Los Angeles stadium 
directly to an appellate court, potentially shortening the CEQA approval process for this project 
by years. Los Angeles Football Stadium Plan Gets Boost, USATODAY.COM (Sept. 28, 2011, 
10:02 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/story/2011-09-28/los-angeles-stadium-
bill/50583414/1. 
 183. See Brief for Housing California, supra note 166, at 2. See, e.g., Karen S. Christensen, 
The Challenge of Affordable Housing in 21st Century California: Constraints and Opportunities 
in the Nonprofit Housing Sector 21–27 (Inst. of Urban & Reg’l Dev., Univ. of Cal. Berkeley, 
Working Paper No. 2000-04, 2000), available at http://escholarship.org/uc/item/5bn582sf 
(describing the significant funding and timing obstacles facing nonprofit housing developers, 
especially those proposing smaller projects). 
  
Fall 2011] SAVE TARA 319 
V.  PROPOSAL 
A.  Legislative Amendment  
of CEQA Guidelines 
Given the high costs of CEQA compliance and the even more 
burdensome costs of CEQA litigation, the legislature should amend 
specific sections of the CEQA Guidelines to reflect the Save Tara 
decision and to set forth clearer standards regarding when a project 
has been approved. First, the legislature should amend Section 
15004(b)(2) of the CEQA Guidelines,184 which purports to set forth 
an exception to CEQA for land acquisition agreements that are 
conditioned on future CEQA compliance, but which was severely 
limited by Save Tara.185 The legislature should move section 
15004(b)(2)(A)’s language exempting certain land-acquisition 
agreements to the CEQA Guidelines’ definition of “approval,”186 and 
broaden the language to reference funding agreements and other 
preliminary agreements entered into by a lead agency that constitute 
 
 184. Section 15004(b)(2) states: 
[P]ublic agencies shall not undertake actions concerning the proposed public project 
that would have a significant adverse effect or limit the choice of alternatives or 
mitigation measures, before completion of CEQA compliance. For example, agencies 
shall not: 
(A) Formally make a decision to proceed with the use of a site for facilities which 
would require CEQA review, regardless of whether the agency has made any final 
purchase of the site for these facilities, except that agencies may designate a preferred 
site for CEQA review and may enter into land acquisition agreements when the agency 
has conditioned the agency’s future use of the site on CEQA compliance. 
(B) Otherwise take any action which gives impetus to a planned or foreseeable project 
in a manner that forecloses alternatives or mitigation measures that would ordinarily 
be part of CEQA review of that public project. 
CAL. CODE. REGS. tit. 14, § 15004(b)(2) (2011) (emphasis added). 
 185. Save Tara v. City of W. Hollywood, 194 P.3d 344, 357 (Cal. 2008) (“The Guidelines’ 
exception for land purchases is a reasonable interpretation of CEQA, but it should not swallow 
the general rule (reflected in the same regulation) that a development decision having potentially 
significant environmental effects must be preceded, not followed, by CEQA review.”). 
 186. Section 15352 states: 
(a) “Approval” means the decision by a public agency which commits the agency to a 
definite course of action in regard to a project intended to be carried out by any person. 
The exact date of approval of any project is a matter determined by each public agency 
according to its rules, regulations, and ordinances. Legislative action in regard to a 
project often constitutes approval. (b) With private projects, approval occurs upon the 
earliest commitment to issue or the issuance by the public agency of a discretionary 
contract, grant, subsidy, loan, or other form of financial assistance, lease, permit, 
license, certificate, or other entitlement for use of the project. 
tit. 14, § 15352. 
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specific exceptions from project approvals that trigger CEQA 
review. 
Additionally, the legislature should amend section 15352’s 
definition of approval to more accurately capture the applicable 
standard of commitment to a project.187 Currently, subparagraph (a) of 
this section purports to grant agencies the discretion of determining 
when approval is granted, but the courts have consistently interpreted 
this discretion away from agencies when they have determined that 
such discretion violates the intent of CEQA. Adding a new 
subparagraph (c) to this section that describes approval and 
commitment in terms of an agency foreclosing alternatives or 
mitigation measures would provide greater guidance to these 
agencies. 
As a result of these changes, section 15004(b)(2) would continue 
to set forth the clear principle that agencies must not “take any 
action” that significantly furthers a project “in a manner that 
forecloses alternatives or mitigation measures that would ordinarily 
be part of CEQA review of that public project.”188 Additionally, 
section 15352 would now define approval so that informed agencies 
and project proponents would understand the limits of their 
discretion. Section 15352 would also contain specific exceptions for 
land acquisition agreements, funding mechanisms, exclusive 
negotiating agreements, and other conditional agreements that are 
conditioned on future CEQA compliance, so long as those 
agreements do not foreclose any future project alternatives or 
mitigation measures. 
While these proposed changes to the CEQA Guidelines may 
seem minor, they would add valuable CEQA policies that have been 
established through court decisions to the Guidelines and therefore 
improve the ability of the Guidelines to inform and guide agency and 
public action regarding the commencement of environmental review. 
Moreover, these low-cost changes would set forth a clearer principle 
regarding the timing of environmental review and would better 
capture the flexible, fact-specific inquiry that Save Tara requires into 
whether a project has been approved. 
 
 187. Id. 
 188. tit. 14, § 15004(b)(2)(b). 
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B.  Best Practices for Agencies 
If agencies have not already done so following Save Tara, they 
must review internal policies regarding preliminary agreements, 
exclusive negotiating agreements, memoranda of understanding, and 
other actions pertaining to predevelopment activities. In revising any 
of these policies, agencies should adopt consistent definitions of 
“project,” “approval,” and “commitment” that reflect the language of 
the CEQA guidelines and the California courts’ interpretations of 
these terms. The Cedar Fair decision provides guidance for agencies 
regarding these issues.189 
Agencies should also establish clear policies stating that initial 
feasibility studies of projects, which may be exempt from review 
under both CEQA’s statutory language and Save Tara,190 are clearly 
distinct from agency commitment to any project. Moreover, agency 
staff and officials should temper potential enthusiasm for a proposed 
project, because public statements supporting such a project may 
indicate an improper commitment prior to CEQA review.191 
Following the intact holdings of McCloud and Santee, agencies may 
wish to refrain from developing detailed project descriptions as part 
of any preliminary feasibility study or conditional agreement. Any 
such agreement should not only include a range of alternatives but 
also include a clear statement that the agreement does not foreclose 
any alternatives or mitigation measures.192 Again, Cedar Fair 
provides guidance here.193 
A more drastic approach for agencies wishing to seek further 
protections from CEQA lawsuits could be to add additional steps in 
their customary approval processes. One option would be to require 
multiple stages of agency approval for preliminary negotiating and 
funding loan agreements.194 Another option would be for agencies to 
 
 189. Cedar Fair L.P. v. City of Santa Clara, 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 667, 679 (Ct. App. 2011). 
 190. tit 14, § 15262; Save Tara, 194 P.3d at 359. 
 191. See Arthur Pugsley, Timing Is Everything: Ensuring Meaningful CEQA Review by 
Avoiding Improper “Precommitment” to a Project, 2009 CAL. ENVTL. L. REP. 243, 251 (2009). 
 192. See City of Santee v. Cnty. of San Diego, 111 Cal. Rptr. 3d 47, 64 (Ct. App. 2010); 
Concerned McCloud Citizens v. McCloud Cmty. Servs. Dist., 54 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 9 (Ct. App. 
2007). 
 193. Cedar Fair, 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 680. 
 194. See, e.g., Memorandum to the City of Sonoma City Council, supra note 174. 
Staff was then directed to negotiate an agreement that would enable them to proceed 
with conducting neighborhood and community outreach, designing and engineering a 
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consider undertaking tiered environmental review for proposed 
projects.195 Under such a tiering process, an agency would conduct 
initial CEQA review for site selection and alternatives, which could 
then be followed by more detailed, site- and project-specific 
environmental review after the proponent has determined more 
characteristics of the project.196 The court in Save Tara also 
suggested that staged EIRs or some other form of tiering may allow 
agencies to postpone the evaluation of certain project details that are 
not reasonably foreseeable when the agency first approves the 
project.197 Of course, tiered environmental analysis involves an early 
commitment to preparing an EIR, and many agencies and project 
proponents would likely resist these additional costs and potential for 
delay. Additionally, while some advocates of a tiering approach 
claim that agencies and applicants could potentially enjoy greater 
protections from litigation at the end of the CEQA process,198 others 
have pointed out that tiering has not reduced the number of 
challenges to projects.199 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
There is no easy fix to prevent future litigation over CEQA’s 
applicability to agency actions. Legislative amendments to CEQA 
 
project proposal, applying for development review, and completing environmental 
review. The proposed Exclusive Negotiating Agreement (ENA) and Predevelopment 
Loan would accomplish this direction. However, the ENA and the loan agreement are 
also structured to avoid pre-judging the outcome of the planning and environmental 
review process. For this reason, if a project is ultimately approved by the Planning 
Commission it would then be necessary to enter into a subsequent agreement with 
AHA in order to proceed with implementation. The ENA and the Loan Agreement 
were prepared by the CDA’s redevelopment counsel who has confirmed that they do 
not do not raise the pre-approval issue that was at the heart of the “Save Tara” case. 
Id. 
 195. For a discussion of tiered environmental review as authorized and encouraged by CEQA, 
see REMY ET AL., supra note 7, at 603–10; see also CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21093(b) (West 
2007) (“[E]nvironmental impact reports shall be tiered whenever feasible, as determined by the 
lead agency.”). 
 196. See REMY ET AL., supra note 7, at 606. 
 197. Save Tara v. City of W. Hollywood, 194 P.3d 344, 361 (Cal. 2008); see also Pugsley, 
supra note 191, at 251 (“Before entering any type of agreement on a specific site, the agency 
should also strongly consider undertaking tiered environmental review, with an initial CEQA 
review for site selection and alternatives, followed by a more detailed, site specific environmental 
review when more details about the specific project are known.”). 
 198. Pugsley, supra note 191, at 251. 
 199. Rothman, supra note 9, at 15–16. 
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are proposed every year, and while minor tweaks along the lines that 
this Note suggests may be possible, wholesale revisions are unlikely. 
As a result, the California Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
“approval” of a project as it set forth in Save Tara will remain in 
effect unless the court issues a superseding opinion. However, given 
the near certainty of continued litigation around the CEQA timing 
issues that are at the heart of Save Tara, further changes to CEQA’s 
treatment of project approvals are likely in store. 
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